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10.1  Introduction 
In the 1980s, the Nicaraguan economy faced massive macroeconomic dis- 
equilibria. Economic activity never recovered the large losses incurred during 
the  1979 revolution  that brought  the Sandinistas to power.  Moreover, GDP 
fell steadily from 1983 to 1989. As a result of  production  losses and rapid 
population  growth, by the latter year GDP per capita had returned to levels 
comparable to the 1940s. Due to the financial needs generated by a continuing 
war effort, private consumption per capita and real wages fell even more. 
This process was accompanied by massive external disequilibria.  As a re- 
sult of these imbalances, the country had accumulated  at the end of  1989 a 
foreign debt of $9,741 million, equivalent to 33 times the exports of goods, 
and more than four times the GDP, the worst debt ratios in the heavily  in- 
debted region  (Rep~blica  de Nicaragua 1990). Finally,  the collapse of  real 
economic activity has been accompanied by equally massive domestic finan- 
cial disequilibria, which exploded into hyperinflation in 1988. From January 
I988 to January 1989, when this process was at its peak, inflation reached an 
astonishing 43  ,OOO%,  the record so far in Latin America and one of the high- 
est in world history. 
Macroeconomic management faced a complex set of constraints, quite dif- 
ferent from those confronted by other Latin American countries in the 1980s. 
Through the decade, Nicaragua continued to receive massive financing from 
abroad. Also, according to ECLAC estimates, the terms of trade did not fare 
badly, either.  I  However, these favorable events were overwhelmed by the im- 
pacts on production and resource availability of the revolution and the Contra 
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war, the U.S. trade embargo and veto on multilateral lending, excessive reli- 
ance on relatively inflexible bilateral assistance from the socialist countries, 
and a series of natural disasters. 
The buildup of macroeconomic disequilibria was  also closely associated 
with economic policy. In  the first years of  the revolution, the government 
adopted an expansionary public expenditure program to improve the poor so- 
cial record  inherited  from  the  Somoza years and  to  accelerate economic 
growth. These goals, particularly the latter, were sacrificed when the govern- 
ment was forced to increase defense expenditure to face the Contra war. Up to 
1988, the central government ran massive budget deficits. Monetary financing 
of  the deficit, together with equally massive subsidies on the use of  foreign 
exchange and credit resulted, with a lag, in hyperinflation. 
The magnitude of  existing disequilibria forced the government to adopt 
more ambitious adjustment programs in  1988 and  1989. In the former year, 
the program emphasized the correction of relative price distortions, particu- 
larly the simplification of  the inefficient and costly multiple exchange rate 
system. In  1989, continuing efforts to correct exchange rate overvaluation 
were combined with a contractionary fiscal policy. 
As this general characterization indicates, macroeconomic events in Nica- 
ragua over the 1980s largely coincide with the concept of  “populism,” as de- 
fined by Dornbusch and Edwards (1990). In particular, following their defini- 
tion, the approach of  the Sandinistas to macroeconomic policy emphasized 
growth and income distribution and disregarded “the risks of  inflation and 
deficit finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to 
aggressive non-market policies.” The sequence of events from expansionary 
aggregate demand policies to collapse and orthodox adjustment was also sim- 
ilar to the prototypical phases defined by these authors. 
Nonetheless, the term “populism” seems somewhat inadequate to charac- 
terize the Sandinista period. Most important, some of the structural reforms 
adopted in  the first years of  the revolution and the very nature of  political 
mobilization were typical of  socialist rather populist regimes. On the other 
hand, contrary to Dombusch and Edwards’s definition, the major constraints 
faced by the Sandinistas were U.S. intervention and the Contra war rather than 
external financing. Finally, some of the typical policies of “populist” regimes 
were absent in the Nicaraguan experience. In particular, the Sandinistas never 
adopted an expansionary wage policy, and a series of  tax reforms increased 
the domestic resources made available to the central government to finance the 
expansion of social services and investment. 
This paper analyzes macroeconomic policies and performance in Nicaragua 
in the 1980s. It is divided in six sections, the first of which is this introduction. 
The second summarizes some features of the Nicaraguan economy prior to the 
revolution. The third considers the effects of revolution and the period of re- 
covery which followed it. The fourth analyzes the buildup of macroeconomic 
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shows the characteristics of the 1988 adjustment program and the hyperinfla- 
tion that accompanied it. The paper ends with a close look at the 1989 stabi- 
lization program. The defeat of the Sandinistas in the February 1990 elections 
is taken as the closing date of the analysis. 
10.2  The Nicaraguan Economy prior to the Revolution 
The recent study by  Bulmer-Thomas (1987) indicates that there was little 
growth in GDP per capita in Nicaragua from the 1920s to the late 1940s (see 
fig.  10.1). This period of  relative stagnation was followed, however, by  an 
export-led boom from the 1950s to just before the revolution. GDP per capita 
multiplied by  2.5 during this period. As this process was matched by  rapid 
population growth, GDP expanded at an average rate of  some 6% a year, the 
fastest in Central America. The rapid growth of cotton exports was the initial 
basis for expansion.  Later on, the process was  reinforced by  new  primary 
exports (beef, sugar, shellfish, etc.) and a boom of  agroindustrial and other 
manufacturing exports to members of the Central American Common Market, 
or CACM (Bulmer-Thomas 1987; CEPAL 1981; Gibson 1987a). 
Rapid economic expansion was  not  translated into an equally rapid  im- 
provement of social indicators. At the end of the boom, illiteracy, child mor- 
tality, and life-expectancy levels were among the worst in Latin America- 
comparable, however, to other Central American countries, excluding Costa 
Rica and Panama.2 Income distribution remained highly skewed, at levels also 
similar to Nicaragua's  Central American neighbors (Brundenius 1987, table 
2). There is little evidence on how distribution evolved during the period of 
expansion. However, available data on labor incomes indicate that real wages 
2. See CEPAL (1988a. pp. 13,45,50)  and n. 4 below 334  Jose Antonio Ocarnpo 
were basically trendless in the 1960s and 1970~.~  As this was accompanied by 
widespread and growing informality in the labor market (Gibson 1987a, table 
2), it may indicate that income distribution deteriorated in the last phases of 
the boom. On the other hand, the concentration  of wealth  in hands of  the 
Somoza family and his political clique was remarkable, as the data on nation- 
alizations following the revolution later revealed. 
Economic management was fairly orthodox throughout the boom. From the 
late 1950s to just before the revolution, the exchange rate was pegged at a rate 
of  seven cordobas per U.S. dollar.  Since 1963, the currency was freely con- 
vertible. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies guaranteed low inflation rates 
but also the transmission of external shocks to the domestic economy. As a 
reflection of limited fiscal and current account deficits, foreign indebtedness 
remained within close bounds (Gibson 1987a, 1987b). 
The economy and economic management experienced, however, increasing 
hardships in the  1970s (CEPAL 1981). Reconstruction efforts after the  1972 
earthquake broke the tradition of fiscal conservatism. In the last years of  the 
Somoza regime, budget deficits increased to an average of over 5% of GDP 
(see table 10.2 below).  This was also reflected in increasing foreign indebt- 
edness. According to ECLAC estimates, the external public-sector debt quad- 
rupled from  1972 to 1979 (from $230 to $961 million).  The counterpart  of 
this process was persistent current-account disequilibria, enhanced by the ad- 
verse effects of the 1973 oil shock, the slowing down of growth of trade within 
the CACM, growing overvaluation of the cordoba, and capital flight in the 
months before the victory  of the  Sandinistas (see below).  To  face growing 
disequilibria,  the Somoza government established mild exchange controls in 
late 1978. In April, 1979, it devalued the basic exchange rate to  10 cordobas 
per dollar and introduced a multiple rate system. 
10.3  Revolution and Recovery, 1979-81 
The economic legacy of the last years of the Somoza regime and the revo- 
lutionary  uprising  was  complex.  Economic  activity  severely  contracted  in 
1978 and 1979, by an accumulated 34.4% (table 10.  I). The capital stock was 
also severely affected.  Losses  associated  with  the destruction  of  buildings, 
equipment, and stocks, the looting of inventories, the slaughter of immature 
beef  cattle,  and the  smuggling of  herds were estimated by ECLAC at $381 
million  (CEPAL 1981), equivalent to 18% of  1980 GDP. National  Accounts 
records  indicate  that  the  loss  of  inventories  in  1978-79  was  equivalent  to 
14.4% of GDP (see table 10.1). To these, we must add capital flight for $535 
million  in the  18 months preceding the revolution  (CEPAL  1981), portfolio 
3. Using the average wage estimated by  INSSBII, and the GDP deflator as a price index, real 
wages (1981 =  100) increased slightly from 1960-64 to 1965-69 (from 100.2 to 107.0)  but then 
stagnated and declined (106.0 in 1970-74 and 103.2 and 1975-79). Table 10.1  Macroeconomic Indicators, 1978-89 
Real Wages 
(I985= 100)  Average  Investment as  Private 
GDP  Growth  GDP per Capita  %J  of  GDP  Fixed  Change of  Consumption per  Monthly 
Rate  GDP  (1977 = 100)  (Constant  Investment  Inventories  Capita  Using GDP  Inflation (CPI) 
(a)  (1977= 100)  ("/.I  Prices)  ("/.)  ("/.I  (1977 = 100)  Deflator  Using CPI  (a) 
___~~  ~ 
1978  -7.9  92.1  89.4  10.7  12.7  -2.0  93.2  139.9  .4 
1979  -26.5  67.7  65.0  -  6.4  6.1  -  12.4  67.9  126.7  4.5 
1980  4.6  70.9  64.9  16.8  14.6  2.2  80.0  119.4  I .9 
1981  5.4  74.7  66.2  24.4  22.2  2.2  68.7  120.8  186.0  1.8 
1982  -  .8  74.1  63.6  20.2  18.0  2.2  59.9  116.9  165.5  1.7 
I983  4.6  77.5  64.3  21 .o  18.1  3.0  56.5  114.6  142.9  2.4 
1984  -  1.6  76.3  61.2  21.6  18.7  2.8  53.6  112.0  135.9  3.4 
1985  -4.1  73.1  56.7  22.3  19.8  2.6  49.3  100.0  100.0  13.0 
1986  -1.0  72.4  54.3  22.3  18.7  3.5  45.3  101.4  59.5  19.5 
1987  -  .7  71.9  52.1  22.1  19.1  3.0  42.9  73.9  24.6  24.9 
1988  -  10.9  64.0  44.9  24.9  21.0  3.9  33.8  50.5  14.9  62.4 
1989  -2.9  62.2  42.1  22.7  14.0  8.7  41.7  33.3  11.6  27.2 
Sources: SPP, INSBII, and INEC. 336  Jose Antonio Ocampo 
losses by  industrial and commercial firms and, of  course, the casualties in- 
flicted by the war. 
The revolutionary government brought with it some emergency measures 
and  a plan for economic recovery but,  above all,  an agenda for structural 
change. The latter was presented as a program for a “mixed economy,” in 
which the state would assume control of the properties of the Somoza family 
and his clique and some “key” economic sectors and considerably expand 
social expenditure  and  its  contribution to  capital accumulation. The  state 
would also encourage the organization of  the popular classes through union- 
ization in urban areas and cooperativization in the countryside. As a result of 
the enhanced role of the public sector, new rules of the game for the private 
sector would be designed. 
One of the first decrees issued by the government after the military victory 
on 19 July 1979 was the nationalization of the properties of the Somoza family 
and their allies who fled the country. It was followed by the nationalization of 
the financial system, foreign trade, large-scale (particularly gold) mining, for- 
estry, and fishing. Few other important nationalizations took place in the fol- 
lowing years, but the government periodically exercised the right to confiscate 
the properties of  capitalists suspected of  counterrevolutionary activities or 
practices that led to the decapitalization of their businesses (Stahler-Sholk et 
al.  1989). Government’s share in GDP rose from  15% to 40% in  the early 
1980s, but then stabilized. The private sector retained a dominant share of 
agriculture,  manufacturing, domestic commerce, and most  services (World 
Bank 1981; Baumeister and Neira 1986; Ruccio 1987; Brundenius 1987). 
The initial nationalization decrees also brought some 20% of land property 
under state control. Land redistribution accelerated as a result of the Agrarian 
Reform Decree issued at the second anniversary of the revolution. As a result 
of both measures, more that 50% of rural property was affected in the years 
following the revolution. During its first phases, the government emphasized 
the development of parastatals and cooperatives, but soon evolved into en- 
couraging small-scale farming. The redirection of agrarian policy was largely 
induced by the need to erode peasant support for the Contras in some regions 
of the country. Nonetheless, it also reflected the social programs of the revo- 
lution and the policy of self-sufficiency in food staples (Enriquez and Spalding 
1987; Neira 1988; Wheelock 1989). 
The initial nationalizations created a large parastatal sector. As  in most 
countries undergoing similar processes, the management problems generated 
by  such a sudden expansion of  the state sector were costly (Colborn 1990). 
On the other hand, the redesign of new rules of the game for the private sector 
proved difficult and in fact led, rather early in the process, to violent confron- 
tations (Vilas 1987). At a purely economic level, the private sector resented 
excessive state intervention in their businesses and government predilection 
for public-sector enterprises. More important, however, the exclusion of the 337  The Nicaraguan Economy 
bourgeoisie from political power and the practice of intermittent  political con- 
fiscations  generated a general sense of insecurity about property rights. 
The inadequate functioning of state enterprises and confrontations with the 
private sector may explain the failure of economic activity to recover rapidly 
in  the years following the revolution. A partial recovery was, nonetheless, 
experienced, based on an expansionary demand policy and an ample supply 
of external financing (Fitzgerald 1989). By  1981, central government expend- 
iture, as a share of GDP, had doubled with respect to levels typical before the 
revolution. The initial  fiscal expansion included many  social programs- 
which induced a rapid improvement in key  social indicators4-but  also de- 
fense and general bureaucratic expenditures. A large part of  this expansion 
was financed by rising taxes. The resulting deficit, of some 9% of GDP, was, 
nonetheless, reasonable in the short run, given the ample supply of  external 
financing (table 10.2). 
In  fact, other domestic macroeconomic indicators were  not  particularly 
troublesome. As a result of the disruption of the domestic distribution net- 
work during the last stage of  the revolutionary uprising, inflation peaked at 
70% in  1979. As supplies stabilized, this price surge was followed by moder- 
ate inflation in the early 1980s-some  20% a year (see table 10.1). Domestic 
liquidity ratios increased with respect to those typical before the rev~lution,~ 
but were stable (table 10.2). finally, nominal wages increased, but there was 
no attempt to raise them in real terms (see table 10.1 and n. 3 above). This 
required, in  fact, a significant political effort by  the Sandinistas to control 
labor demands (Vilas 1987). The policy strategy adopted by the government 
thus implied that workers would receive increasing real income through gov- 
ernment services-a  “social wage”, as it was called-but  would contribute, 
through wage restraint, to the recovery of economic activity. 
The core external sector indicators moved, however, in the wrong direction. 
Neither traditional nor nontraditional exports ever reached prerevolutionary 
levels (table 10.3). The reduction of exports as combined in the early years 
with a deterioration of the terms of trade. On the other hand, the revolutionary 
government inherited a clearly overvalued cordoba and  a rate of  inflation 
clearly incompatible with a fixed exchange rate. There was no attempt to cor- 
rect such imbalances. A steady real appreciation of the cordoba then ensued. 
It was accompanied by a strong depreciation of the black market rate (fig. 10.2 
4. Life expectancy at birth increased from 56.3 years in 1975-80 to 62.3  years in  1985-90,  as 
child mortality fell from 9.3%  to  6.2%.  At the same time, the illiteracy rate fell from 42.5%  in 
1970 (and a similar figure just before the revolution) to  13.0% in  1985 (see CEPAL 1988a. pp. 
13,45,50). 
5. Estimated on the basis of end-of-year monetary aggregates, the ratio MllGDP increased 
from 13.1% in  1974-1978  to 22.6%  in  1980, whereas M2/GDP increased from 20.7 to 30.5% 
(see IMF, International Financial Sfnrisrics). The methodology used in table 10.2 puts such li- 
quidity indicators at 20.9%  and 33.0%  in 1980. Table 10.2  Fiscal and Monetary Indicators (%  of GDP at current prices) 
1974-78  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Central government accounts: 
Current incomea  12.5 
Total expenditure  17.7 
Deficit  -5.2 
Central government expenditureb 
Social services 
Infrastructure and production 
Defense 
Public administration 
Consolidated public sectar deficit 
(IMF) 
Public-sector enterprises, ex- 
Unpaid foreign interest 
Means of  payment 
Quasi money 
cluding utilities 
Monetary stocks as proportion of  GDP:d 
14.0  22.2  24.4  25.7  31.2 
21.2  31.2  33.3  38.1  52.9 
34.5  39.2  61.0 
10.2  9.5  11.4 
7.6  10.1  24.7 
1.6  7.4  11.0 
9.1  12.2  14.0 
-7.2  -9.0  -8.9  -12.4  -21.7 
-25.1 
-  10.7 
-4.1 
20.9  20.0  21.8  27.2 
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20.6  18.9 
46.4  21.4 
46.4  19.6 
11.2  4.8 
4.9  2.1 
18.5  8.0 
11.7  4.6 
-25.8  -2.5 
-31.3  -10.2 
-6.7  -  10.1 
-6.8  -5.7 
16.6  7.5 
1.2  1.1 
Sources: Ministry of Finance, SPP. IMF, and Central Bank. 
'Excludes foreign transfers. 
bTotal  expenditure according to these figures is apparently based on budgets and, thus, does not coincide with expenditure according to the central government accounts. 
?Excludes unpaid foreign interest and deficit of public sector enterprises (excluding utilities). 
dAverage monthly ratio between aggregate and annual GDP. Table 10.3  External Sector Indicators (Millions of dollars unless otherwise indicated) 
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'Coffee, cotton, sugar, meat, shellfish, bananas, sesame seeds, molasses and gold 
bExcluding re-exports. 
cExcludes interest arrears and some short-term debt. 
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and  table  10.3). The political climate generated by  growing confrontations 
between the Sandinistas and the private sector accentuated this trend. 
Although strong import and exchange controls became a central feature of 
external sector management during the first years of the revolutionary govern- 
ment, the former were not particularly harsh.  Indeed, the import coefficient 
reached a historical peak  in  1980 and  1981 (table  10.3). Growing external 
imbalances generated by record imports and weakening exports were financed 
by record capital inflows. Thus, as outstanding debts were renegotiated, the 
country had ample access to new financing. Resources came from multilateral 
agencies and bilateral sources, both in the developed countries (including the 
United States) and the Third World (Mexico in particular), and only secondar- 
ily from socialist countries  (see Stahler-Sholk  1987; Arana et al.  1987; and 
table 10.3). The result of this strategy was, of course, the rapid growth of the 
external debt. By 1981, the debt had already reached extremely critical levels 
(table 10.3). 
10.4  War  Economy and Macroeconomic Disequilibria, 1982-87 
10.4.1  General Features of Macroeconomic Management6 
The expansionary demand policy adopted during the first years of the rev- 
olutionary  government  could be defended on the grounds that the access to 
external  financing should be  used to  ensure a fast turnaround  of  economic 
activity  and an equally  rapid improvement  in key  social indicators.  On the 
other hand, as we have seen, the macroeconomic package typical of the first 
years revealed some prudence on behalf of the government, as reflected in its 
wage  and  tax  policies.  Nonetheless,  by  itself,  external disequilibria  would 
have called for a significant policy shift as early as 1981. 
The government did not grasp the urgent need for action. Indeed, the sys- 
tematic lag in the adoption of the stabilization policies and the partial nature 
of  such efforts once they were adopted became central features of Sandinista 
macroeconomic  management  early in the postrevolutionary period.  “Volun- 
tarism” and economic ideologies go a long way to explain some of these fea- 
tures-particularly  the strong preference  for intricate government  interven- 
tion rather than traditional orthodox macroeconomic management.  However, 
political dynamics played an equally important role. 
As  one would expect, the government  was unwilling to give up  what  it 
thought to be the essential goals of the revolution or to adopt policies that it 
thought  would  affect the economic  recovery  and, even  more, risk  military 
6. For a more extensive  analysis of  this period, see Arana et al. (1987). Fitzgerald (1989), 
Gibson (1987b), IMF (1988), Medal (1988), Pizarro (1987). Taylor et al. (1989), and the World 
Bank (1986). Stahler-Sholk et al. (1989) presents also a very useful chronology, which would be 
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defeat.  Nonetheless, the  political  process  worked  in  peculiar  directions. 
Understandably, defense and social expenditure became the most inflexible 
components of  the budget. Paradoxically, however, the government was, at 
the end, more willing to sacrifice real wages and capital accumulation than to 
reduce the massive subsidies to the productive sector. Its strong political con- 
trol of the labor movement and public-sector enterprises and, on the contrary, 
its feeble relations with the private sector and the need to guarantee the sup- 
port of the peasants in the Contra war, go a long way to explain this paradox. 
Although the first signs of  government concern for the balance of  pay- 
ments-the  adoption of export-promotion policies-came  as early as 1982; 
the “populist” dynamics of expenditure policies were in full swing up to 1984. 
By then, domestic disequilibria had reached clearly explosive levels. Forced 
by the circumstances, the government adopted the first important stabilization 
measures in 1985, including cuts in nondefense expenditure, readjustment of 
government-regulated prices, and devaluation. This was followed by  similar 
steps in the subsequent years. However, the inconsistency of the stabilization 
packages implemented from 1985 to 1987 enhanced macroeconomic disequi- 
libria. Particularly, rising inflation eroded the tax base, and attempts to repress 
inflation and defend exporters against official exchange rate overvaluation led 
to massive relative price distortions and booming black markets. As a conse- 
quence of these imbalances, the government was finally forced to adopt more 
drastic stabilization measures in 1988 and 1989. 
On top of  the dynamics generated by  “populist” expenditure policies and 
inconsistent macroeconomic management, the revolutionary government also 
had to face during this period the destabilizing impact of the Contra war and 
the U.S. anti-Sandinista campaign. The war had additional demand effects, as 
it forced a further expansion of  government expenditure. However, the war 
and the U.S. campaign had also significant supply effects (Fitzgerald 1987; 
Gibson 1987b). Aside from the destruction of resources and production gen- 
erated by  the war,  it created multiple labor shortages associated with the di- 
version of young workers into military service, rural-urban migration, scarc- 
ity of  labor in  some crucial (particularly coffee-producing) regions, and the 
flight of  skilled workers abroad. On the other hand, the 1985 U.S. embargo 
forced an inefficient substitution of trading partners. Finally, the suspension 
of direct U.S. aid soon after Reagan was inaugurated in  1981 and the Ameri- 
can veto on multilateral lending in the following years, forced the country to 
rely  increasingly on  inflexible bilateral  assistance from socialist countries 
(table 10.3; see also Stahler-Shock 1987). 
10.4.2 
the First Stabilization Efforts 
As a reflection of policy decisions and defense needs, central government 
expenditure continued to increase rapidly after  1981, peaking at 58.7% in 
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1984.’ As table 10.2 indicates, the most dynamic element from 1982 to 1984 
was the expenditure in infrastructure and production (largely investment out- 
lays). However, all components of central government expenditure continued 
to increase at rapid rates. Efforts to raise government revenues were success- 
ful, and by  1984 the country had one of the highest tax rates of Latin America. 
Nonetheless, the growth of  expenditure clearly outstripped the tax effort. In 
the same year, the central government deficit reached 23.5% of GDP-26.6% 
for the consolidated public-sector deficit, according to a partial estimate using 
IMF data.* 
Growing pressures generated by macroeconomic disequilibria and the Con- 
tra war led the government to undertake significant expenditures cuts starting 
in  1985. However, the war forced a further increase in defense expenditure, 
which peaked  over  18% of  GDP in  1986-88.  Thus,  the  government was 
forced to concentrate cuts in civil expenditure. From 1984 to 1987, expendi- 
ture on infrastructure and production fell to very modest levels, and foreign 
interest payments were all but suspended, as the expansion of public admin- 
istration costs earlier in the decade was reversed. Expenditure in  social ser- 
vices was maintained, however, at historically peak levels. 
Overall,  central  government  expenditure  was  reduced  from  58.7% to 
44.1% of  GDP from  1984 to  1987. Noninterest civil expenditure fell even 
more, by  some  18% of  GDP,  but remained slightly above 1980-81  levels. 
Unfortunately, most  of  the expenditure cuts were  defeated by  the adverse 
Olivera-Tanzi effect on government  revenue^.^ Thus, the central government 
deficit remained at 16.5% of GDP in 1987. As we will see shortly, other major 
components of  the  public-sector deficit, particularly Central Bank  losses, 
were even more inflexible. Thus, the overall public-sector deficit never fell 
below 20% of GDP, even if unpaid interests on the external debt and the deficit 
of several public-sector enterprises are excluded. 
The monetary impact of  deficit financing was  dramatic. However, up  to 
1984, the economy absorbed it through an impressive increase in liquidity, 
7. As  pointed out in note b of  table  10.2, total expenditure according to central government 
accounts does not coincide with data on destination of expenditure by ministries, which is used to 
make up the breakdown shown in the second part of  the same table. The former figures are used 
in the text when refemng to total spending. 
8. We have excluded from this figure both unpaid foreign interest and deficit estimates for the 
“rest of  the public sector.” The former are unlikely to ever be paid. The latter have been estimated 
by  the IMF on the basis of domestic lending, which is a poor approach in a highly inflationary 
economy. The estimates of central bank losses in recent years are also subject to controversy. 
9.  This was the dominant element in the erosion of tax revenues in 1984-87 and through 1988. 
Given a month’s lag in the collection of tax and other current incomes (a lag that seems to have 
been reached by  the end of this period), the  1984 share of  current government income in GDP 
would have fallen to 29.1% in  1987 and 22.4%  in  1988 as a result of  faster inflation. Thus, 
additional effects on government income, such as domestic recession, had a secondary role in the 
erosion of the tax base. They may be important, however, as an explanation of the recent stabili- 
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with only a modest acceleration of  inflation (see tables 10.1 and  10.2). Al- 
though the lack of  an inflationary tradition goes a long way  to explain this 
result, it was  also supported by  a fixed exchange rate and strong price con- 
trols. The importance of these latter factors is supported by the significant role 
played by  explicit adjustments in the official exchange rate and other con- 
trolled prices in the inflationary dynamics after 1985 (see below). 
Oddly enough, the demand for money grew faster than that for term depos- 
its up to 1984 (table 10.2). Several factors may explain this result. First of all, 
nominal interest rates were hardly readjusted with inflation up to late 1988.1° 
With rising inflation, this meant that term deposits became a close, though 
illiquid, substitute for money. In a more orthodox pattern, excess domestic 
liquidity was reflected in the increasing demand for black market dollars, as 
the evolution of the relevant real exchange rate indicates (fig. 10.2, part C). 
The demand for dollars was enhanced by political instability and the growing 
overvaluation of the official exchange rate (fig. 10.2, part A, and table 10.3). 
The role of political factors may explain why devaluation in the black market 
overshot the rapid increase in liquidity levels and monetary aggregates actu- 
ally collapsed in terms of (black) dollars (table 10.3). 
By  1984 the official exchange rate was only a minimal fraction of the black 
market rate (table 10.3 and fig. 10.2, part B). This finally convinced the gov- 
ernment to devalue the official rate from 10 to 28 cordobas per dollar in Feb- 
ruary 1985. As we have seen, the devaluation was accompanied by some aus- 
terity measures in the fiscal area. The need for fiscal austerity also led the 
government to massively readjust controlled prices  (basic consumer goods 
and gasoline) at the same time. 
In an attempt to regulate the wage structure, the government decreed in 
1984 a complete wage  scale (SNOTS), to which, theoretically, public and 
private firms were to abide. As a result of the price adjustments adopted in the 
first months of  1985, the government then attempted to defend them against 
inflation, and thus adjusted the scale three times from February to May 1985, 
increasing the average wage by  146%. The adjustment was slightly higher 
than inflation during these months, but not enough to compensate for the fall 
in real wages in previous years. Nonetheless, returning to its otherwise “un- 
populist” wage policy, this attempt to index wages was soon abandoned. In 
the following months and years, wage policy was ineffective and in fact did 
not seriously try to avert the collapse in real wages that accompanied the ex- 
plosive inflationary dynamics (table 10.1). Under these conditions, and with 
the increased demand for labor generated by  growing black markets, incen- 
tives to work in the “formal” sector (including the government) were reduced. 
10. The most important increase in interest rates took place in early  1986. Most lending rates 
were then established in the 20%-30% range. The highest rate (for loans to  commercial firms) 
was then placed at 45%  a year (Medal 1988, table 32). 346  Jose Antonio Ocampo 
The result of this process was a general fall in labor productivity, high labor 
rotation, and growing payments in kind.“ 
10.4.3 
The stabilization package adopted in early 1985 clearly induced a “regime” 
change: from an “atypical” excess liquidity/low domestic inflationhapidly ris- 
ing  black-official  exchange  rate  differentials, to  a  more  “classical”  flight 
against the currency and explosive inflationary effects of monetary expansion. 
The former regime was undoubtedly one of “repressed inflation” (cum foreign 
exchange speculation). The  “fundamentals” were thus bound  to prevail at 
some point. However, in the transition from one regime to the other, the ex- 
plicit pricing decisions adopted by the government in the first months of  1985 
played the crucial role. In fact, as figure 10.3 shows, the first dramatic accel- 
eration of  inflation in the postrevolutionary period came as the direct effect of 
these policy decisions. 
After this turning point, the price-monetary dynamics became explosive. 
The average monthly inflation rate constantly accelerated until it reached hy- 
perinflation in  1989 (table 10.1). Under these conditions, price controls be- 
came  totally  ineffective  and  only  led  to  widening  differentials between 
the legal and the free markets for goods subject to regulation.’*  The monetary 
fuel was provided by  the budget deficit, but also by  the losses of  the Central 
Bank in foreign exchange transactions and the need to finance most of the 
nominal expansion  in  domestic credit through money  creation.  The  latter 
was  made  necessary by  the decision to fix  nominal interest rates at artifi- 
cially low levels. Moreover, as the official exchange rate was only devaluated 
once more  during  the period  under analysis (in February  1986, when  the 
official rate  was  devalued  to  70 cordobas per  dollar),  the costs of  dollar- 
denominated domestic debts (foreign trade financing) were also kept at very 
modest levels. 
Accelerating inflation was accompanied by  a great variability in monthly 
rates. Moreover, as figure 10.3 indicates, rather than the stepwise acceleration 
typical of “inertial” inflationary processes, it adopted a neat cyclical pattern. 
The length of  the cycle was annual from  1985 to  1987. Hyperinflation was 
basically associated with the dramatic shortening in the length of the cycle to 
some four to five months in  1989. What is more interesting, some  turning 
points, but not the intensity of the cycles, were associated with explicit deci- 
The Outburst of Inflationary Pressures 
11. In 1986 labor rotation in the central government was 50%.  As a result, 44%  of government 
employees in 1987 had one year or less in service (Secreteria  de Planification  y Presupuesto 1989). 
For payments in kind in the government, see n. 18 below. In mid-1989, some private entrepreneurs 
informed the SIDA Mission that the costs of different payments in kind were three times the costs 
of  the nominal wage bill. 
12. In  May  1989, just before the major liberalization of domestic prices (see sec.  10.5). the 
ratio of black  market to  official market prices was the following  for some important consumer 
goods: rice 5.5, kidney beans 5.2, soap 12.7,  detergent 16.6, and toilet paper 2.4 (Secreteria de 









I  I  I  I  I 
1984  1985  1986  1987  I988  1989  990 
Fig. 10.3  Monthly inflation rate, 1984-90 
sions to correct basic pricing imbalances: February 1985, the same month in 
1986 and, as we will see below, February and June 1988. 
As traditional monetary theory predicts,  accelerating inflation was accom- 
panied  by  falling demand for domestic liquid assets.  For reasons that have 
already been mentioned, the demand for term deposits declined ahead of that 
for money.  The latter remained, in fact, surprisingly high even at fairly ad- 
vanced stages of the hyperinflationary process (table 10.2). The strong under- 
development of the domestic financial market goes a long way to explain this 
result.  Finally, despite the gross and increasing overvaluation  of the official 
exchange rate (fig.  10.2, part A) and the dramatic widening in blacWofficial 
rate differentials (table 10.3 and fig.  10.2, part B), falling liquidity was ac- 
companied by an appreciation of the real black market rate (fig. 10.2, part C). 
Some policy measures may have supported the process, particularly the crea- 
tion of  a “grey” (parallel) foreign exchange market in  1985,13 where foreign 
remittances and a fraction of export earnings could be legally sold. Massive 
U.S.  aid to the Contras may have also supported this paradoxical outcome. 
The parallel market was actually part of a more general multiple exchange 
rate regime. Since 1982, this regime became increasingly complex, reflecting 
the decision to defend exporters against the growing overvaluation of the cor- 
doba. It included two basic mechanisms: exporters were authorized to keep 
part of the foreign exchange earned, and domestic support prices for export 
crops were fixed at levels higher than those compatible with prevailing inter- 
national  prices and the official exchange rate. The basic difference between 
the two systems was the mechanism by which the implicit “export incentive” 
13. As part of the package of February 1985, foreign exchange houses were allowed to operate, 
under the regulation (and, in fact, ownership) of the Central Bank. The first and most important 
of the two existing houses, NECSA, started to operate in June of  that year. BICSA started to so in 
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was financed. In the first case, it was paid by  importers of goods and services 
who bought the foreign exchange in the parallel market. In the second, it was 
financed by the Central Bank. 
As table 10.4 indicates, both mechanisms were quite effective in raising the 
average exchange rate for exports significantly above the official rate (to al- 
most 100 times greater by January 1988). The latter was increasingly relevant 
only  for  a few  exports  (mainly from state enterprises) and most  imports. 
Under these conditions, the government had to rely on direct import controls 
to ration import demand. As most imports were sold by parastatals, the mas- 
sive subsidy implicit in the grossly overvalued official rate was,  to a large 
extent, passed on to the final user, subject, in any case, to significant resource 
misallocation, rationing, and growing secondary black markets. Late in the 
process (June 1987), the government adopted a surcharge for most imports 
(the tasa de estabilizacidn monetaria, or TEM) to finance the  foreign ex- 
change losses of  the Central Bank. By  January  1988, this mechanism had 
raised the average import rate significantly above the official rate; still, the 
average export rate was almost  13 times higher than that applicable to im- 
ports. 
Given the features of the multiple rate system, the collapse of exports that 
took place through most of this period (table 10.3)  was only partly associated 
to exchange rate policies. A myriad of  factors, affecting both the domestic 
supply and the external demand, account for the collapse of exports: the ef- 
fects of  war in some areas of the country; lack of  confidence by  the private 
sector; stronger incentives (price and, particularly, credit) given to food crops; 
inefficiencies of state enterprises; the exodus of skilled labor and other labor- 
supply shortages; and the collapse of the CACM, which was decisive for non- 
traditional exports.  These same factors were responsible for the decline in 
economic activity since  1984 (table  lO.l), as production  for the domestic 
market continued to grow at moderate rates up to  1987 (I  .2%  a year in the 
period 1984-87). 
Although imports fell with respect to the early postrevolutionary peak, they 
remained at historically high levels. In any case, the country was able to fi- 
nance its record external deficits, despite skyrocketing debt ratios and the in- 
terruption of capital flows (table 10.3). Three sources were basically used to 
finance the deficits: mounting payments arrears, bilateral assistance from so- 
cialist countries, and prefinancing of export crops. 
10.5  1988 Stabilization and Hyperinflati~n'~ 
By early 1988, economic conditions were critical. The most transparent to 
all economic observers were the massive distortions associated with the mul- 
14. For  a more extensive analysis of  the  1988 and  1989 stabilization packages, see Arana 
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tiple exchange rate system (table 10.4). However, this was only a manifesta- 
tion of generalized macroeconomic disequilibria.  Monetary and fiscal imbal- 
ances were  already  reflected  in  extremely  high  inflation  rates-an  average 
monthly rate of 24.9% in 1987 (see table 10.1)-which  had led to the virtual 
collapse of  price controls. External deficits had also resulted in near general- 
ized moratoria on the foreign debt. Finally, the country had already experi- 
enced a substantial fall in GDP per capita and an even stronger contraction of 
real wages and private consumption per head. This dramatic deterioration in 
economic conditions were combined by clear signs that the Contras were in 
disarray, that the war was losing intensity, and that peace talks among Central 
American presidents were being successful, as reflected  in the Esquipulas  I 
Accord of  August  1987. 
These conditions were  the  background  to the two massive  stabilization 
packages implemented  in  February and June  1988. The goals of  these pro- 
grams were multiple and ambitious (Secretaria de Planificacion y Presupuesto 
1988a). They included (1) the realignment  of relative prices; (2) a reduction 
of inflation rates by austere fiscal and monetary policies; it was stated early in 
the year that the central government deficit would be reduced to 10% of  GDP 
in  1988 and eliminated altogether by  1990; (3) reversing the deterioration of 
the formal sector of  the economy generated by price controls and falling real 
wages; and (4) reconstituting the normal economic functions of the wage pay- 
ments  system.  Wage  policy  aside-which  was  explicitly  conceived  as  a 
supply-side  policy-the  objectives  and instruments  of  the stabilization plan 
were fairly orthodox, as the IMF (1988) acknowledged later in the year. 
Although  these stabilization  packages  were more ambitious than any pre- 
vious effort, they tended to reproduce patterns that had been common to mac- 
roeconomic  policy since 1984. Particularly,  the different goals were not pur- 
sued  with  the  same  vigor,  nor  were  the  packages  globally  consistent. 
Emphasis was placed on relative price realignment.  This fact was reflected in 
the outcomes of the programs, as we will see below. On the contrary, fiscal 
and monetary policies were not  made consistent with  the inflation  targets. 
Also, as in 1985, the attempt to defend or even increase real wages was soon 
abandoned, giving way to a different policy later in the year. 
The February package included five major provisions. The first was a mon- 
etary reform, by which 1,000 old monetary units were converted into one new 
cordoba. This reform included the demonetization  of  some 20% of  existing 
liquid assets, which had, attached to  it, explicit political goals.lS  The mone- 
tary reform was accompanied by the consolidation of all explicit and implicit 
exchange rates  into two legal  rates:  10 new  cordobas in  the  “official” and 
15. The short period necessary to make the conversion in the banks (three days) was planned to 
leave the Contra with a sizable stock of  useless bills.  It  was also determined that households 
converting more than 10 million old cordobas had to leave their money in deposit at the banks for 
12-14  months.  This was aimed at  speculators  and  black  market  arbitrageurs  holding  sizable 
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10.25 in the “parallel” market. In relation to January levels (table 10.4), this 
implied that the official and average import rates were multiplied by  143 and 
19, respectively, and the average export rate was devalued by 46%. However, 
the new legal rates were set significantly below the black market rate. Third, 
the government decreed significant increases in controlled prices. This was 
accompanied by a 675% increase in the average SNOTS wage level. Finally, 
it announced a 10% cut in central government expenditure. 
The major successes of  this package were associated with exchange rate 
policies: the official rate was massively devalued in real terms, as the black 
market rate appreciated and exchange rate differentials narrowed (fig.  10.2, 
parts A and C). Nonetheless, the official rate remained clearly overvalued, and 
no mechanism was adopted to avert its further real appreciation (only two 
minor devaluations of one new cordoba per dollar each were adopted in April 
and May). 
The major weaknesses of  the February package were related, however, to 
fiscal and, particularly, monetary policies. The initial cut in central govern- 
ment expenditure was clearly insufficient to reach the target deficit, as the 
Olivera-Tanzi effect was eroding the tax base at a fairly rapid rate (see n. 9 
above). On the other hand, the maximum domestic lending rate was kept at 
45% a year, and the government decided that the devaluation of the official 
rate would not be passed on to dollar-denominated liabilities. Under prevail- 
ing conditions, these decisions were equivalent to a generalized debt forgive- 
ness. They also implied that the Central Bank would continue to incur in mas- 
sive losses in foreign exchange transactions and that any nominal increase of 
domestic credit would have to be financed by money creation. 
The mix of massive exchange rate, price and wage adjustments, and weak 
demand policies initiated a new inflationary cycle, more intense than those 
experienced in previous years (fig. 10.3). Under these conditions, price con- 
trols were totally ineffective and real wages soon fell below  1987 levels (see 
table  10.1 and table 10.6 below). The government then abandoned any at- 
tempt to arrest the fall in real wages. 
The June package liberalized most prices and wages, decreed massive in- 
creases in those prices that remained under the government’s control (particu- 
larly gasoline), and deepened the exchange rate reforms but did little to make 
the global stabilization policy more consistent. The official exchange rate was 
then devalued by  700%, and the parallel/black market differential consider- 
ably narrowed. In the following months, the parallel and, since late August, 
the official rate were devalued more frequently (the latter five times between 
31 August  1988 and 4 January  1989). As a result, the overvaluation of  the 
official rate was considerably reduced. Although the blacWofficia1 exchange 
rate differential remained substantial, it narrowed considerably with respect to 
previous years. 
Nonetheless, fiscal policy was not significantly affected by  the June deci- 
sions. There was also no attempt to control the growth of  credit. However, 352  Jose Antonio Ocampo 
two important reforms in monetary policy took place in June. First, the gov- 
ernment did not assume the exchange rate risks on dollar-denominated domes- 
tic debts. Given devaluation policy, this decision considerably raised the costs 
of  such debts, if  contracted after February.I6 Second, authorities decided to 
index domestic interest rates. However, the “indexing rule” used was imper- 
fect,  particularly  in  the  first few  months.”  Thus,  from mid-June  to  mid- 
September, the maximum effective lending interest rate was set at  14.9% a 
month. Beginning in mid-September, the rule was improved. Still, in the last 
months of  the year, interest rates ran significantly below inflation levels (see 
table 10.5). 
In June,  government wages were adjusted by  30%. Given massive price 
increases accumulated since February (790%), this was an extremely moder- 
ate rise. They were adjusted more frequently after September (monthly, ex- 
cept in December) but at a level systematically below inflation rates. To com- 
pensate for this fact, government employees were  granted a food  subsidy 
(AFA) in August.I8 
The  series  of  maxidevaluations and  massive  adjustments  in  regulated 
prices,  together  with  the  inability of  the  authorities to  control the  major 
sources of monetary growth were the fundamental sources of the 1988 hyper- 
inflation. As figure 10.3 indicates, the economy underwent three distinct price 
cycles between January  1988 and the first moths of  1989. The first two of 
them were clearly unleashed by  the adjustment programs of February and 
June. The third was more closely associated with the effects of  Hurricane 
Joan,  which  hit  the  country  in  October,  generating  losses  estimated  by 
ECLAC at $840 million (CEPAL 1988b). The third cycle was the most in- 
tense. In total, the inflation rate ran close to 100% a month between Septem- 
ber 1988 and January 1989. 
Overall, the monthly inflation rate was 64.5% between December 1987 and 
January 1989. It was led by public-regulated prices (public utilities and trans- 
portation), which increased by  more than 80% a month during this period. 
Following  a classical pattern,  this process was  accompanied by  rapid  de- 
monetization. By  January  1989, M1 as a share of GDP had fallen to 6.5% 
(table  10.5). On  the other hand,  reductions in  aggregate demand,  relative 
price changes induced by the adjustment programs (real devaluation and wage 
cuts, in particular), and supply shocks (the hurricane and electric supply fail- 
ures during the first semester) led to a 10.9% fall in GDP. This was accompa- 
nied by a renewed deterioration of exports and the balance of payments. 
16. For a debt contracted just after the February devaluation and paid in mid-January 1989, the 
monthly interest rate was 61.9%,  somewhat below inflation (63.7% a month in the same period). 
However, the closer the debt was contracted before the June devaluation, the higher the implicit 
interest rate. Thus, a liability contracted  just before that devaluation and paid in January 1989 had 
a monthly cost of 107.7%,  or  19.3%  in real terms. 
17. An annual interest rate was determined by adding up the monthly inflation rates. 
18. The subsidy took the form of the right to buy a basket of basic food products (10 lbs. of 
rice,  10 Ibs. of beans, and 5 Ibs. of sugar) paying between 5%  and 10%  of their nominal wages. Table 10.5  1989 Adjustment Program 
1988  1989 
Average  Last Quarter  January  February  March  April  May  June 
FiscaVmonetary connection (% of  GDP): 
Central government deficita 
Monetary emission-Deficit 
Total monetary emission 
(% of GDP): 
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(continued) Table 10.5  (continued) 
1989  1990 
July  August  September  October  November  December  January  February 
Fiscalimonetary connection (5% of  GDP): 
Central government deficita  1.4  -4.0  ~  2.6  1.6  .6  .8  -3.1  3.4 
Monetary emission-Deficit  8.3  8.0  86  4.9  11.1  14.8  13.2  10.  I 
Total monetary emission  9.7  4.0  6.0  6.5  11.7  15.6  10.0  13.5 
Monetary aggregates 
(% of  GDP): 
Means of  payments 
Quasi money 






Monthly inflation (CPI) 
6.9  1.7  7.9  7.8  7.9  8.4  8.3  8.5 
.8  1.1  1.4  1.5  1.3  1  .5  1.5  1.4 
94.0 
81.1  83.4  73.3  65.3  82.7  80.3  90.4  86.3 
= 100): 
104.1  104.7  126.2  118.2  111.7  103.5  103.5 
20.2  22.0  13.5  9.1  38. I  33.5  33.2  49.5 
25.0  22.0  13.5  1.7  29.2  24.4  19.2  22.2 
32.3  7.7  11.9  14.4  16.2  19.2  34.2  11.4 
Nominal monthly interest rates: 
Lending: agriculture  14.9  15.0  14.1  10.0  10.0  13.0  15.0  13.0 
Lending: industry  18.0  18.0  14.4  10.0  10.0  13.0  15.0  13.0 
Lending: commerce  20.0  20.0  17.3  13.0  13.0  17.0  19.0  15.0 
Term deposits (3ms)  33.8  27.2  24.0  19.6  23.4  26.0  21.1  16.0 
Source$: SPP. Central Bank, and INEC. 
aNegative sign indicates fiscal surplus. Excludes foreign transfers in I988 355  The Nicaraguan Economy 
10.6  The 1989 Adjustment Program 
If massive relative price distortions associated with the multiple exchange 
rates and price controls were the dominant economic feature of  Nicaragua in 
January  1988, hyperinflation had  taken over that place one year later.  The 
urgent need for action was reflected in the rapid pace of demonetization and 
the generalized lack of confidence in government policies. Moreover, the au- 
thorities had few instruments to handle the explosive price dynamics. Price 
controls had collapsed in mid-1988 after several years during which they be- 
came increasingly ineffective. The official exchange rate was still overvalued 
and too distant from the parallel and black market rates to be used as an anti- 
inflationary weapon. Finally, scarce foreign exchange placed severe restric- 
tions on any attempt to fix the exchange rate or liberalize imports. 
Under these conditions, the government correctly understood that a very 
orthodox policy was called for, combining fiscal and monetary austerity with 
additional relative price adjustments. The package adopted by the authorities 
in January included six major provisions. First of all, central government ex- 
penditure was  massively cut to reach an expected deficit of  5.6% of  GDP 
(Ministerio de Finanzas 1989). In practice, expenditure was cut even further 
by  transferring to the ministries in the first months of the year less resources 
than were demanded according to budget allocations.  I9  An  essential element 
of fiscal austerity was a significant cut in public-sector employment (compuc- 
tucibn)  . 
Second, the government adopted a restrictive credit policy, accompanied by 
active interest rate management. The authorities aimed at keeping positive 
real returns on term deposits and real costs for all (or most) types of  credit. 
Third, a system of gradual devaluation was adopted in late January. In prac- 
tice, this led to small or medium-size devaluations some three times a month. 
This was accompanied by important readjustment of  real regulated prices in 
the first months of the year.  On the other hand, as in  1988, the authorities 
stated the objective of arresting further deterioration of real wages in the pub- 
lic sector. 
In the speech in which President Ortega made public the new program, he 
also announced willingness to establish new rules of the game for the private 
sector; as a first step in that direction, he informed that expropriations would 
cease.*O Finally, the government adopted a financial programming system co- 
ordinated by  the Planning Secretariat (SPP) and significantly improved the 
data base for short-term macroeconomic analysis. 
In terms of some of its major targets, the stabilization program was initially 
19. Transfers were cut by 33% in January, 25% in February, 20% in March, and  18% in April. 
See Secretaria de Planificacion y Presupuesto,  Sintesis evaluativa de las principales variables 
econdmicas de abril I989 yprogramacidn de mayo 1989, May 1989, p. 6 (similar documents will 
be quoted hereafter as Sintesis evaluativa). 
20. See “Esfuerzo nacional por la Paz p la Reconstrucci6n,” Barricada (31 January 1989, pp. 
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very successful. Inflation rates fell rapidly (fig. 10.3). Actually, by March, the 
CPI increased by 8%, excluding public utilities and transportation.  This im- 
plies,  in turn, that the government was effective in increasing real regulated 
prices. On the other hand, the government was quite successful in devaluing 
the official exchange rate in real terms and in stabilizing the parallel and black 
markets. By March, differentials  between the different foreign exchange mar- 
kets had been reduced to less than 10%. 
In  the  face of  falling  inflation  rates, demonetization  ceased  in  February 
(table 10.5). The demand for term deposits also increased since that month, 
but  remained  fairly  low  by  historical  standards.  The government  cut  and 
maintained  central  government  expenditure  at low  levels.  Indeed,  as table 
10.2 indicates,  such expenditure  stabilized around  20%-23%  of GDP,  less 
than half the average 1988 level. Starting in June, the government actually ran 
fiscal surpluses in a few months.  Finally, the fall in real wages was also ar- 
rested (table 10.6). 
The major initial cost of  stabilization was a strong recession.  In  the  first 
quarter of the year, industrial production fell by 17% with respect to the same 
period in the previous year. However, it started to recover in the second quar- 
ter (table 10.6). Cattle production for the domestic market was also severely 
hurt. On the contrary, with a few exceptions (cotton), exportables experienced 
a boom. Other inward-oriented sectors (e.g., agricultural foodstuffs and elec- 
trical energy) were either stagnant or experienced some recovery.  21 
Employment effects were significant. By June, central government employ- 
ment had fallen by  14.3% with respect to the same month in  1988-1  1,000 
employees, approximately  (Secretaria de Planificacion  y Presupuesta  1989). 
Interestingly enough, there were also a significant number of unfilled vacan- 
cies in the central government, as the way budget allocations were transferred 
to the different ministries actually encouraged this phenomenon.22  In the same 
month,  16,500 civil employees, including those in public-sector enterprises, 
had been  affected by compuctucibn. This figure had increased to 17,000 by 
This was equivalent to 2% of the labor force of the country. Ma- 
nagua household surveys reflected this massive reduction of public-sector em- 
ployment.  However, they indicated that it did not lead to increased open un- 
employment (which remain  surprisingly low, at 5%-6%  of the labor force) 
but to growing informality (rising proportion of self-employment and workers 
in very small enterprises) and longer unemployment spells.24 
The major problems faced by the stabilization program in the first months 
of the year were both related to monetary policy. Aside from the central gov- 
ernment, other domestic agents were subject to a credit crunch (table 10.6). 
21. Sinresis evuluutivu (June 1989, and succeeding months). 
22. The wage costs of vacant positions were transferred by the Ministry of  Finance. The differ- 
23. Sinresis evuluutivu (August 1989, p. 21; December 1989, p. 23). 
24. Sintesis evuluutivu (September 1989, App. 2). 
ent ministries used them to selectively increase wages of existing employees. Table 10.6  Additional Quarterly Indicators, 1988-89 
1988  1989  1990 
I  I1  Ill  IV  I  I1  I11  IV  I 
Domestic credit (millions of 
1980 cordobas)' 
Short term  879.1 
Long term  87.0 
Trading companies  302.0 
Total  1,268.  I 
exchange houses (thousand dollars, 
monthly average): 
Purchases  1,344.5 
Sales  1,171.0 
With GDP deflator  94.8 
With CPI  28.0 
Manufacturing production 
(billions of May  1989 
cordobas)  134.9 
Transactions in the foreign 































































127.8  103.7  123.7  124.6  119.7  113.3  111.1  125.6 
Sources: Central Bank, Ministry of Labor, and MEIC. 
'Using GDP  deflator as the price index. 
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The most important exception was found in the government trading compa- 
nies,  which,  at  the  same time,  continued  to  receive  massively subsidized 
credit. The profits made by  these companies by  the joint effect of credit sub- 
sidies and real devaluation were transferred to the producers of export crops 
(particularly coffee and cotton) by  periodic resettlement of accounts (reliqui- 
duciones), fueling the money supply. 
Interest rate policy became also a major source of complications. Nominal 
rates were raised effective 15 February. In the face of rapidly falling inflation, 
ex post real rates were extremely high from February to April (table 10.5). 
Pure backward indexation rules and significant lags in decisions-rates  were 
adjusted only once a month-and  information contributed to the same phe- 
nomenon. Some of these problems were eventually solved: “forward’ index- 
ation criteria were  introduced in April  and weekly readjustments in June. 
However, the political opposition to high interest rates led the government, in 
a meeting with agricultural producers on 17 and 18 April, to agree to stabilize 
lending rates, to establish ceilings on lending rates and new subsidized long- 
term rates,  and to grant a mix of  debt forgiveness and debt restructuring at 
low interest rates for foodstuffs and cotton producers. Starting in May, these 
agreements led the government to fix  some and, in June, all lending rates 
below deposit rates (table 10.5). 
More generally, the authorities were unable to control sources of monetary 
growth different to the central government (see “Monetary Emission-Defi- 
cit” in table  10.5). From March to May,  this led to a sizable expansion of 
liquidity. Monetary  expansion  was  reflected  in  moderately  rising  inflation 
rates in May and, particularly, in a speculatory wave in the foreign exchange 
market. The latter process was interpreted in some parts of the government as 
a sign that the official rate was still overvalued and that a maxidevaluation was 
called for. These sectors were apparently successful in restricting the official 
supply of dollars to the parallel market. Expectations of devaluation then be- 
came generalized and were reflected in massive speculation in the parallel and 
black markets. The authorities then decided to “follow the market” and deval- 
ued the official rate by  1  1  1% on June 12. 
This devaluation was  soon reflected  in  massive inflation, which  rapidly 
eroded most of  its real effects (see table 10.5). It also initiated a new “stop- 
go” cycle, not unlike that experienced during the first semester. Inflation came 
down fairly rapidly, reaching 8% in August. This was initially accompanied 
by  a dramatic fall in  liquidity. However,  as the government was  unable to 
control all sources of  monetary expansion, liquidity and inflation started to 
pick up. Once more, this was reflected in speculation in the foreign exchange 
market  in  November. This time,  the government maintained the system of 
gradual devaluation of the official rate, thus averting major foreign exchange 
speculation and a new inflationary shock. However, it also kept liquidity at 
high levels. Aside from this basic change in policy reactions, there were also 
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First, the negative interest rate margins widened (table 10.5). Second, the size 
of the parallel market doubled (table 10.6). This was equivalent, in fact, to an 
unplanned import liberalization. 
Overall, the 1989 stabilization program was less contractionary and more 
effective in terms of  the inflation and exchange rate targets than its  1988 
predecessor. However, its inconsistency and fragility were apparent to many 
economic observers (see, e.g., Fishlow et al. 1990). First of all, it was clear 
that the cut in central government expenditure could not be indefinitely main- 
tained. On the other hand, as we have seen, monetary and interest rate policies 
remained a source of  considerable difficulties. The sensibility of the foreign 
exchange market continued to be a major source of instability. This reflected, 
in turn, the inability of the government to raise an adequate supply of liquid 
foreign aid. Indexation increased in  1989 to levels, which are incompatible 
with permanent reductions in the inflation rate. Finally, although the room for 
private initiative considerably widened, no major advance was made in terms 
of designing stable rules of the game for the private sector. 
The February 1990 elections changed the course of macroeconomic events. 
Attempts  to  maintain  previous  stabilization efforts  ceased  altogether.  By 
April, strong increases in government wages were reflected again in high fis- 
cal deficits, rapid growth in the money supply and an imminent new wave of 
hyperinflation. Moreover, the official and parallel exchange rates were grossly 
overvalued and regulated domestic prices were considerably repressed. Mas- 
sive macroeconomic disequilibria induced by  these policy decisions forced 
the Chamorro administration, inaugurated on 25 April  1990, to undertake, 
once more,  massive adjustment efforts. This time, however, they  faced a 
strong labor union resistance. This, as well as other events at the outset of the 
new  administration clearly indicate that the February elections had done so 
far little to overcome the political paralysis that affects the relations between 
the Sandinistas and the powerful private interests of Nicaragua. 
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Comment  Ann Helwege 
Jose Antonio Ocampo’s essay is rich in detail about economic policies pur- 
sued by the Sandinista regime. It also makes available data that has been vir- 
tually inaccessible to those outside the Nicaraguan government. 
The paper presents the economy as one in a chronic state of disequilibrium. 
Ocampo describes a series of  short-run policies aimed shoring up the econ- 
omy, all of which ultimately failed. The paper is thorough and meticulous in 
its description of these policies. My main recommendation would be to high- 
light fundamental reasons for the instability and the failure of  stabilization 
efforts, and to set these apart from less significant specific policies. 
What Went Wrong? 
At the risk of being a bit repetitive, let me emphasize arguments that Eliana 
Cardoso and I made earlier (see chap. 3, in this volume). The Sandinistas do 
not represent a classic case of populism. Urban wage earners lost throughout 
the regime’s tenure. Real wages fell every year after 1981 and even 1979-81 
wages were below prerevolution wages. Unlike classic populists who served 
employed workers, the Sandinista’s redistributive efforts were directed toward 
the poor in the form of  literacy campaigns, health programs, and agrarian 
reform.  Although  the  regime  meets Dornbusch and  Edwards’ criteria for 
“economic populism,” namely, it ran large deficits leading to hyperinflation, 
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it does not share populist characteristics common to Peron, Vargas, and Ve- 
lasco. 
There are several underlying reasons for the economic crisis that developed 
under the Sandinistas. 
From the start, socialist rhetoric and threats to expropriate property created 
uncertainty for private producers, who were expected to generate the bulk of 
output. This uncertainty made early consolidation of the economy difficult. 
Second, overvaluation meant that investment was  not only risky, but un- 
profitable. 
Third, world prices of cotton and coffee slumped. Uncertainty about prop- 
erty rights, overvaluation, the U.S. embargo, and low world prices made ex- 
port production unattractive. Neither cotton nor coffee production ever recov- 
ered its prerevolution level. 
Fourth, the large government deficit played a significant role in generating 
hyperinflation once Contra activity began. Before then, massive foreign aid 
financed social spending and kept inflationary pressure under control. With 
the onset of the war, the deficit soared to 30% of GDP in  1983 and stayed in 
the 150/0-25% range thereafter. Foreign donors lost interest, and the printing 
press took over as a major means of finance. 
The war made a bad situation unmanageable. It forced the government to 
devote half its budget to the military; it exacerbated labor shortages and de- 
stroyed infrastructure; and it diverted foreign exchange toward weapons, forc- 
ing industry and agriculture to struggle along without imported parts and fer- 
tilizers.  It  also  made  a  mockery  of  Sandinista  intentions  to  redistribute 
income. Not only were social programs ultimately cut, but generous subsidies 
were given to large agricultural producers in the hope of maintaining exports 
to finance the war. By  1986, private consumption had fallen to only one-third 
of its prerevolution level. 
Parenthetically, I would add that it is a mistake to emphasize the role of bad 
weather in the development of  the economic crisis. Agricultural output was 
depressed throughout the 1980s. FA0 data show that even the best harvest, 
that of  1982, fell 20% below that of  1978. Although the agrarian nature of the 
Nicaraguan economy makes it unusually vulnerable to climatic shocks, the 
factors described above are more important in explaining a decade of agricul- 
tural stagnation. 
A massive stabilization effort was implemented in  1988. On a technical 
level, its failure can be attributed to the fact that the devaluations did not keep 
up  with inflation, impressive as they were in nominal terms. Moreover, the 
fiscal deficit remained excessive for reasons pointed out by  Ocampo, includ- 
ing the effect of inflation on the tax base. New attempts at stabilization in 1989 
also collapsed. 
At a more basic level, the failure of stabilization programs can be attributed 
to the inability of the Sandinistas to reduce uncertainty and to establish clear 
rules of the game. Having challenged property rights, they could not restore 363  The Nicaraguan Economy 
the confidence of  private producers. Expropriation of  a major sugar mill in 
July  1988 did not help. Compounding the uncertainty about property rights 
was concern that defense expenditures would continue to create fiscal imbal- 
ances. 
Whither the Future of Socialism in Latin America? 
I have argued elsewhere that the Allende regime faced problems that were 
quite different from those faced by  the Sandinistas.  I  In  contrast to Nicara- 
guans, Chileans were more urbanized, better educated, and enjoyed a mark- 
edly higher standard of living. Allende’s challenge was to maintain industrial 
output to satisfy a large, politically powerful middle class. The agrarian nature 
of the Nicaraguan economy and the simple lifestyle of its people enabled the 
Sandinistas to build a constituency through land reform and basic social ser- 
vices.  Nonetheless,  both  Allende and the  Sandinistas challenged property 
rights while depending on a market economy. 
Oscar Lange argued in  1938: 
A socialist government really intent upon socialism has to decide to carry 
out its socialization program at one stroke or to give it up altogether. The 
very coming into power of such a government must cause a financial panic 
and  economic collapse.  Therefore,  the socialist government must either 
guarantee the immunity of private property and private enterprise in order 
to enable the capitalist economy to function normally, in doing which  it 
gives up its socialist aims, or it must go through with its socialization pro- 
grams  with  maximum speed.  Any  hesitation, vacillation  and indecision 
would provoke the inevitable economic catastrophe. Socialism is not an 
economic policy for the timid.2 
The problem with massive expropriation is that a fully centralized economy 
is hard to manage and tends to lead to stagnation in poor countries. The Cu- 
bans have succeeded because of  Soviet aid; neither Nicaragua nor Chile re- 
ceived enough aid to follow Cuba’s path. 
Is socialism in Latin America due for a requiem? Yes. The Soviets are no 
longer interested in  supporting revolutions abroad.  Two  failures have tar- 
nished the model’s appeal regionally. It is possible that a socialist regime will 
again take power, in Peru or El Salvador, for example, but it is unlikely that it 
can succeed in meeting popular expectations. 
The demise of  socialism need not mark the end of serious efforts to redis- 
I. A. Helwege, “Three Socialist Experiences in Latin America: Surviving U.S. Economic Pres- 
sure” (Bullerin of  Latin American Research 8, no. 2 [ 19891: 21 1-34).  Also, see Helwege, “Is 
There any Hope for Nicaragua?” (Challenge [November/December, 19891: 22-28). 
2. See D. Morowitz, “Economic  Lessons from Some Small Developing Countries” (World 
Development 8 [ 19801: 337-69)  for Lange quote. The original statement is found in 0.  Lange and 
F. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 
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tribute  income.  Income distribution  in Latin  America remains  very  inequi- 
table relative to the rest of the world. Capitalist growth requires clear rules of 
the  game and  secure property  rights,  but there  is no evidence  that  growth 
depends on continued inequity. 
Lessons for the Region 
The Nicaraguan experience with unsuccessful stabilization efforts provides 
useful lessons for nonsocialist regimes. 
First, the rules of  the game with respect to private property need to be clear 
whether or not the government is socialist. By freezing bank assets, the Collor 
administration has created a major credibility problem for investors in Brazil. 
It takes years to regain the trust that is lost with one such freeze. The Mexi- 
cans learned this in 1982. Rudiger Dornbusch likens the move to wife beating: 
once done, the relationship is irrevocably changed, whether or not the beating 
occurs again. 
One can make this argument somewhat more general. Having once let an 
economy spin out of control, it is difficult for a regime to regain public confi- 
dence. For this reason, a change in regime (not necessarily  a coup) may be 
important for stabilization to succeed. 
Second, for all the ease with which economists prescribe stabilization mea- 
sures, they are remarkably difficult to implement. If austerity were as easy as 
swallowing a bitter  pill,  we would  see more of  it today.  Political  pressure 
prevents cuts in government programs, and tax compliance is hard to enforce. 
We  need  more work by  political  scientists to understand how  one builds  a 
consensus to support stabilization.  Karen Remmer’s work comparing the ef- 
fectiveness of democratic and authoritarian regimes in stabilizing economies 
offers a useful starting point.3 
A third lesson is that devaluations do not jumpstart an economy. They are 
effective in reducing external imbalances by cutting imports. They do not gen- 
erate growth unless they are accompanied by renewed confidence in economic 
stability. In theory, devaluations stimulate the production of tradable goods. 
Together with high interest rates, they also encourage the return of flight cap- 
ital.  To  do so effectively, however,  investor trust  is essential.  No  firm will 
expand its productive capacity if it expects continued instability and potential 
expropriation  of assets.  Devaluations may be the Latin American equivalent 
of “pushing on a string.” 
What Does the Future Hold for Nicaragua? 
U.S. intervention and the Contra war have caused enduring damage. Most 
Nicaraguan professionals emigrated and are now unlikely to give up the new 
3. K. Remmer, “Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience” (World 
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lives they built in the United States. The war damaged a capital base that was 
weak to begin with: what industry existed in the 1970s depended on the Cen- 
tral  American Common Market, which dissolved with regional hostilities. 
There is now  very little industrial capacity in  place. Furthermore, political 
polarization as a result of the Contra war leaves open the possibility of contin- 
ued civil war. The new government will find it very difficult to attract inves- 
tors. 
Nicaragua is  a poor agrarian society, made poorer by  events of  the past 
decade. Having shown that the Sandinistas could not match the strength of 
U.S. pressure, it remains for the United States to prove, through generous aid, 
whether the Nicaraguans have gained anything by crying uncle. 
Comment  Arnold C. Harberger 
It is hard for me  to comment critically, maybe not  even objectively, on  the 
work of JosC  Antonio Ocampo. For it is not an exaggeration to say that prob- 
ably close to half of  what I know about the Nicaraguan economy I learned 
from him (either through his writings or through contact with him in profes- 
sional meetings and working sessions). My experience in other countries had 
led me to believe that populism on the political scene had bad economics as 
its handmaiden. In this I do not mean to equate populism with left-of-center 
politics-not  by  a long shot. Left-of-center governments have, in  fact, run 
some quite good economic policies in recent years (Spain under Gonzalez, 
France under Mitterand, New Zealand under Lange, Australia under Hawke), 
but they have done so by trying to be consistent, to face reality, to live within 
budget constraints, to reduce economic distortions. In my  opinion, left-wing 
governments, when  they have  succeeded in  their economic policies, have 
done so precisely by eschewing populism. 
Nothing in the Nicaragua story, as told by Ocampo, leads me to change the 
opinion expressed above. In the background we have the fact that prior to the 
Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua shared with other Central American coun- 
tries the phenomenal economic boom of  1960-77.  Indeed, Nicaragua tripled 
its GDP between 1959 and 1977, catching up to Guatemala and El Salvador 
and narrowing Costa Rica’s lead in terms of per capita income. The boom did 
not  bring an equally rapid improvement in  social indicators, however, and 
undoubtedly the seeds of  a successful revolution were sown by  the Somoza 
family itself, in the virtually unbridled avarice with which it sought an ever- 
expanding control over the economic as well as the political arena. 
Perhaps because of the professional nature of the forum in which his paper 
was presented, Ocampo does not dwell on the vast numbers of sheer blunders 
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(at the microeconomic level) that underlay the patchwork quilt of  economic 
policy put together by  the Sandinistas. To  be sure, he mentions the extensive 
nationalization, the agrarian reform, the rapid expansion of the public sector, 
and the widespread use of price controls. But in the main he focuses on the 
macroeconomic side. Fiscal deficits, monetary expansion, artificially low in- 
terest rates, Central Bank losses, exchange-rate maladjustments, import con- 
trols, and multiple exchange rates-these  are the items that are grist for his 
mill. Ocampo does not overlook the mistakes implicit in the elements just 
listed, but the main message that comes through-at  least to this reader-is 
one of  surprise of how “traditional” were the measures taken to stabilize the 
economy, once the goal  of  stabilization was  taken  seriously. He  mentions 
the dramatic reductions of government spending, the conscious efforts to raise 
the average real exchange rate facing exporters, and the freeing of many prices 
in June of  1988. He points out, too, the halving of government expenditure 
by  1989, the reduction of public employment, the application of a restrictive 
credit policy, the use of active interest rate management and the adoption of a 
sort of crawling-peg exchange rate system. All these are familiar components 
of “standard” Latin American stabilization. 
This helps explain why a reaction of surprise is triggered in a professional 
audience. Why surprise? Because amid the jungle of  policy mistakes there 
appears clear evidence that at least some voices were striving to bring about 
more rational economic policies. First, partial measures (starting in  1985), 
then more full-blown stabilization efforts (in  1988 and  1989) represent the 
fruits of their striving. Central government expenditure reached its peak in 
1984, at close to 60  percent of GDP, which was reduced to 44 percent by 1987 
and to below 30 percent in 1989. An inflation which peaked at over 60 percent 
per month in  1988 was cut to some 27 percent per month in  1989. In the 
process, real wages were drastically reduced. By  1987 they were less than 
half their pre-revolutionary level; the stabilization programs led to still further 
drastic cuts. 
Is this populism? To  me, it certainly looks and tastes like something else. 
Yet  a single visit to Nicaragua is enough to convince anyone with an econo- 
mist’s eye to see that the economy is in a shambles. 
I do not have the basis (in either study of or experience with the Nicaraguan 
economy) to make sense out of the conflicting signals. What is clear to me is 
that the voices of reason did not prevail sufficiently,  that vast uncorrected mis- 
takes were still present in economic policy up through the passage of  power 
from the Sandinistas to their loosely linked opposition, which presently con- 
trols the government. 
What I would like to do now is concentrate on just one area-bank  credit 
to the productive sector of the economy-in  which I have had the occasion to 
work a bit, and to study the available data. Fortunately, this area is pregnant 
with lessons, both for economists and for policymakers. 
We  start with the story of  the  1960s and  1970s. During this period, bank 367  The Nicaraguan Economy 
credit to the private sector was abundant, by normal LDC standards. The year- 
end data from International Financial Statistics show that at no point in these 
two decades did private-sector credit fall short of  M2. How did such an un- 
usual relationship prevail for so long a time? Through a pattern in which the 
banking  system borrowed abroad (and from some domestic sources) to  fi- 
nance loans well beyond the level dictated solely by its deposits. How large in 
absolute magnitude were these loans to the private sector? The answer is, 
simply huge. Starting from about 15 percent of  GDP in  1960, they grew to 
some 25  percent of  GDP by  1970, and reached over 50 percent of  GDP by 
1980. This was all, so far as I can see, genuine financial intermediation. The 
savings of  some were being transferred to others, who put those savings to 
productive use, and who paid for the right to do so. 
The story changed swiftly. By  1984, the strictly private sector had loans 
equal to about 15 percent; by 1985 that went below 10, and from 1987 to 1989 
below  1 percent of GDP. If  we include credit to the so-called APP (national- 
ized productive) sector along with  the strictly private sector, we  find such 
credit at some 35 percent of GDP in  1984, some 15 percent in  1985, going 
down to less than 3 percent in 1987, and less than 2 percent in  1989. 
It is clear that whatever the economic function that bank credit to the pro- 
ductive sector was performing, that function was incredibly eroded over the 
decade of the 1980s. With credit so scarce, one would think it would come to 
carry a huge price, in real terms. But no, the actual story is just the reverse. 
Instead of  carrying a positive price,  it carried a hugely negative one.  And 
instead of functioning as a vehicle for financial intermediation, bank credit to 
the  private (productive) sector was permuted into a mechanism of  transfer 
payments. 
How  does such a mechanism work? Imagine an economy in  which bank 
loans are made for a term of six months, at zero nominal interest, and in which 
prices double every quarter.  Let  new  loans be  issued  each quarter  in the 
amount of  2 percent of GDP. By next quarter they amount to  1 percent, and 
by  the end of the following quarter they are worth only .5 percent of GDP and 
are paid off. Each quarterly “cohort” of bank loan recipients gets 2 percent of 
GDP in credit,  and pays off  something like  .5 percent of  GDP six months 
later. Total outstanding credit follows a sawtooth pattern going down from 3 
percent of GDP at the beginning of each quarter (after the maturing loans have 
been paid off  and the new ones extended,) down to 1.5 percent of GDP at the 
end of each quarter (before the maturing loans are paid off  and before the new 
ones are extended). 
The above example shows how, with a very low ratio of bank loans to GDP, 
substantial transfers can nonetheless be effectuated using the machinery of 
bank loans at vastly negative real interest rates. This is basically what Nicara- 
gua’s bank credit system has been doing over the past several years. The fig- 
ures are not as neat as those of the example, but they can be found by simply 
taking each quarter’s (or month’s or week’s) “gross lending” minus “interest 368  Jose Antonio Ocampo 
plus amortization,” deflating the resulting figure by the average price level of 
that period, and adding up the results for a year, to be then compared with that 
year’s GDP in real terms. 
The whole phenomenon  of transfers via the credit mechanism deserves to 
be studied with care, its history chronicled, its causes sought. In the meantime 
let me note that what little evidence I  have seen suggests a gross transfer of 
close to 4 percent of GDP being effectuated through the credit machinery in 
1989, with about two-thirds  of that  sum going to what in the  statistics are 
called  “productive  loan”  borrowers  (private  sector plus  APP),  and  the  rest 
going to state marketing enterprises. 
This vast deterioration of Nicaragua’s credit system, and its conversion (I 
would  say perversion) into a mechanism of  haphazard  transfers must  have 
some explanation, but explaining it does not signify defending it. I find it hard 
to imagine that a professional  economist would want to try to defend it, or 
even know how to begin such an attempt. Certainly, Ocampo offers no defense 
for it, but neither  does he explain  such a tremendous  deviation from solid 
economics and even from straight common sense, existing side by side with 
the nonpopulist, rationalizing efforts pointed out 6y Ocampo and cited earlier 
in this comment. 
I certainly do not think that the rationalizing efforts cited by Ocampo are 
the cause (or the explanation) of the sorry state of the Nicaraguan economy 
today. To  the contrary,  I see in those efforts the professional hand of  econo- 
mists. But in the story of bank credit I find no professional touch at all. The 
new makers of economic policy in Nicaragua are essentially going to have to 
build a new system of bank  (or financiera) credit from scratch.  And if  one 
seeks reasons in the realm of economic policy for the dismal performance of 
the Nicaraguan economy during the Sandinista years, one must, I think, look 
also for the causes of the other major mistakes, which, added to the monetary 
and credit debacle, created the problems that Ocampo’s reformers in the post- 
1985 period were bravely struggling to surmount. 
In my opinion, the Nicaraguan economy got to where it is through a series 
of policy  blunders, of  which the bank  credit episode  is just one example, 
simply the best example I know. It is gratifying to know that there were coun- 
tercurrents of economic rationality during that period. But it is important to 
realize that the countercurrents were no more than just that (the counterculture 
to Sundinismo, as it were). The main currents were what swept the Nicara- 
guan economy into its present dismal situation. Whether those currents can be 
tagged with the label of populism  I do not know and would not venture to 
guess. But that they can be accurately tagged with the label of bad economics 
I have not the slightest doubt. 